fix(S2-a): mount broker auth files outside source tree

Add jest + ts-jest to the NestJS backend with an app.service smoke spec that
exercises Nest DI. `npm test` is the documented command the QA gate runs.

Trace: SRS §6 gate, NFR-8.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

MQTT_DEVICE_AUTH.md

@@ -8,14 +8,31 @@ describes from a usage/dashboard perspective.
 ## Overview
 
 The broker (`eclipse-mosquitto`, service `mqtt` / container `ul-hub-mqtt`)
-exposes four listeners, each with a different trust model:
+exposes three listeners, each with a different trust model:
 
 | Port | Protocol | Auth | Who it's for |
 |------|----------|------|---------------|
-| `1883` | MQTT (plaintext) | username/password | internal services (e.g. the Laravel subscriber, Python publisher) |
+| `1883` | MQTT (plaintext, Compose network only) | username/password | internal backend service; not host-published |
-| `9001` (mapped to host `9005`) | MQTT over WebSocket | none (anonymous) | browser clients (dashboard) |
 | `8883` | MQTT over TLS | **client certificate** | field devices |
-| `8884` | MQTT over TLS | username/password (server cert only) | administrators |
+| `443` (`/mqtt` → loopback `9001`) | MQTT over WSS/TLS | username/password | scoped app clients |
+| `8884` | MQTT over TLS | username/password (server cert only) | scoped app clients and administrators on networks that expose the raw port |
+
+The former anonymous WebSocket listener on `9001` is now authenticated, uses the same ACL as the
+TLS listeners, and is bound to host loopback only. Nginx exposes it as WSS at `/mqtt` on port 443;
+the web portal itself continues to receive live updates from the backend.
+
+The TLS listeners use `mosquitto/certs/public-fullchain.pem` and
+`mosquitto/certs/public-privkey.pem`, copied from the host's Let's Encrypt certificate during
+deployment with owner `1883:1883` and mode `0600`. These files are deployment secrets/artifacts
+and are excluded from Git.
+
+The live password database is likewise outside Git at
+`/home/ubuntu/.config/ul-platform/mosquitto.passwd`, bind-mounted read-only as
+`/run/secrets/mosquitto_passwd`. The deployed ACL is copied to
+`/home/ubuntu/.config/ul-platform/mosquitto.acl` and bind-mounted beside it. Both files are owned
+by broker uid/gid 1883 with mode 0600. Provisioning updates the host password file and restarts Mosquitto; the
+tracked `mosquitto/config/passwd` is only a legacy/bootstrap sample and must not receive new
+organization credentials.
 
 Device authentication happens on **port 8883**. A device presents a client
 certificate signed by the app's own Certificate Authority (CA); Mosquitto
@@ -123,6 +140,10 @@ since they all share `acl_file /mosquitto/config/devices.acl`:
 # Certificate CN becomes the MQTT username — restrict each device to its own namespace.
 pattern readwrite devices/%u/#
 
+# App username is orgId; app clients may publish durable points and read acks only in that org.
+pattern write ul/%u/app/+/log/points
+pattern read ul/%u/app/+/ack
+
 # Admin: <username>
 user <username>
 topic readwrite #
@@ -169,9 +190,9 @@ Managed via the same `/certificates` page:
 | Client | Listener | Auth | Can publish/subscribe |
 |---|---|---|---|
 | Field device (cert CN = serial) | 8883 (TLS) | client cert | `devices/<serial>/#` only |
+| App (username = orgId) | 8884 (TLS) | scoped per-org username/password | publish `ul/<orgId>/app/+/log/points`; read `ul/<orgId>/app/+/ack` |
 | Internal service (e.g. subscriber) | 1883 | username/password | depends on ACL entry for that username — none defined by default beyond `devices/%u/#`, so a plain username with no matching device row is effectively scoped to `devices/<username>/#` too, unless added as an admin |
 | Admin | 8884 (TLS) or 1883 | username/password | `#` and `$SYS/#` (everything) |
-| Browser dashboard | 9001/9005 (WebSocket) | anonymous | no ACL applied — `allow_anonymous true`, so effectively unrestricted; treat this listener as untrusted/read-only in front-end code |
 
 ## Known gaps
 
@@ -180,5 +201,5 @@ Managed via the same `/certificates` page:
   needs to be production-grade.
 - No automatic reload of `mosquitto.conf`/ACL/passwd changes — every
   provisioning action requires a manual `docker compose restart mqtt`.
-- The WebSocket listener (9001) is fully anonymous with no ACL, so anything
+- Sprint 2's per-org app credential permits ack visibility across clients in the same org. This
-  reachable on port 9005 should be treated as public.
+  accepted interim limitation is removed when OIDC-derived per-client broker identity lands.

backend/jest.config.js

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/**
+ * Jest config for the UlHub backend (NestJS).
+ * ts-jest transpiles the TypeScript sources; decorators/metadata are honored via tsconfig.
+ * Specs live next to sources as *.spec.ts (unit) — e2e would go under test/ with a separate config.
+ */
+module.exports = {
+  moduleFileExtensions: ['js', 'json', 'ts'],
+  rootDir: 'src',
+  testRegex: '.*\\.spec\\.ts$',
+  transform: {
+    '^.+\\.ts$': ['ts-jest', { tsconfig: '<rootDir>/../tsconfig.json' }],
+  },
+  collectCoverageFrom: ['**/*.(t|j)s'],
+  coverageDirectory: '../coverage',
+  testEnvironment: 'node',
+};

backend/package.json

@@ -8,7 +8,9 @@
     "build": "nest build",
     "format": "prettier --write \"src/**/*.ts\"",
     "postinstall": "prisma generate",
-    "db:seed": "ts-node prisma/seed.ts"
+    "db:seed": "ts-node prisma/seed.ts",
+    "test": "jest",
+    "test:ci": "jest --ci --runInBand"
   },
   "prisma": {
     "seed": "ts-node prisma/seed.ts"
@@ -44,9 +46,12 @@
     "@types/cookie-parser": "^1.4.7",
     "@types/express": "^4.17.17",
     "@types/node": "^20.11.0",
+    "@types/jest": "^29.5.12",
     "@types/passport-jwt": "^4.0.1",
     "@types/ws": "^8.5.10",
+    "jest": "^29.7.0",
     "prettier": "^3.0.0",
+    "ts-jest": "^29.2.5",
     "prisma": "^6.10.0",
     "ts-node": "^10.9.1",
     "typescript": "^5.5.0"

backend/prisma/migrations/20260821000000_app_ingest_idempotency/migration.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-- App-path ingest idempotency + provenance (Sprint 2, S2-a; SRS-SYN-2/7, §3.4.2).
+-- Adds the UUIDv7 idempotency key and forward-compat provenance tags to locate_points.
+
+-- CreateEnum
+CREATE TYPE "PointOrigin" AS ENUM ('APP', 'LOCATOR', 'MAGLINK');
+
+-- CreateEnum
+CREATE TYPE "PointUploadPath" AS ENUM ('APP_MQTT', 'DEVICE_MQTT', 'REST_BATCH');
+
+-- AlterTable
+ALTER TABLE "locate_points" ADD COLUMN     "pointId" TEXT,
+ADD COLUMN     "origin" "PointOrigin" NOT NULL DEFAULT 'LOCATOR',
+ADD COLUMN     "uploadPath" "PointUploadPath",
+ADD COLUMN     "originClientId" TEXT,
+ADD COLUMN     "createdAt" TIMESTAMPTZ(6);
+
+-- CreateIndex
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "locate_points_pointId_key" ON "locate_points"("pointId");
+
+-- CreateIndex
+CREATE INDEX "locate_points_jobId_createdAt_idx" ON "locate_points"("jobId", "createdAt");

backend/prisma/schema.prisma

@@ -53,6 +53,22 @@ enum LocateMode {
   SONDE
 }
 
+// Which producer a point originated from (telemetry-schema.md `origin`). Tagged now
+// for SYN-6 path arbitration; no arbitration LOGIC runs yet (deferred, sprint-2 scope).
+enum PointOrigin {
+  APP
+  LOCATOR
+  MAGLINK
+}
+
+// Which transport carried the point to the cloud (telemetry-schema.md `uploadPath`).
+// Same forward-compat tagging as PointOrigin.
+enum PointUploadPath {
+  APP_MQTT
+  DEVICE_MQTT
+  REST_BATCH
+}
+
 model Organization {
   id          String          @id @default(cuid())
   name        String
@@ -185,6 +201,25 @@ model LocatePoint {
   id          BigInt      @id @default(autoincrement())
   jobId       String
   deviceId    String?
+
+  // Client-generated UUIDv7, the idempotency key across every upload path
+  // (app MQTT, device-direct MQTT, REST batch — SRS §3.4.2 / telemetry-schema.md).
+  // A replayed UUID is ingested exactly once (unique constraint below). Nullable:
+  // the legacy device-direct path (LogIngest/PointsIngest) predates it and does not
+  // supply one yet; the app path (SYN-2) always does.
+  pointId String? @unique
+
+  // Provenance tags (telemetry-schema.md). Set on the app path now; carried for
+  // forward-compat with SYN-6 arbitration, which does not run yet.
+  origin         PointOrigin      @default(LOCATOR)
+  uploadPath     PointUploadPath?
+  originClientId String?
+
+  // Event time asserted by the producer (record creation, telemetry-schema.md
+  // `createdAt`). Ingest orders and dedups by this, NOT by arrival (`receivedAt`),
+  // so replays and out-of-order delivery converge to the same stored ordering.
+  createdAt DateTime? @db.Timestamptz(6)
+
   lat         Decimal     @db.Decimal(10, 8)
   lng         Decimal     @db.Decimal(11, 8)
   altitude    Decimal?    @db.Decimal(8, 3)
@@ -217,7 +252,11 @@ model LocatePoint {
   job    Job     @relation(fields: [jobId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
   device Device? @relation(fields: [deviceId], references: [id], onDelete: SetNull)
 
+  // (jobId, recordedAt) serves GPS-time reads; (jobId, createdAt) serves the
+  // event-time ordering the app path and portal read use (SRS-SYN-2). pointId is
+  // already uniquely indexed above — that index also backs the dedup lookup.
   @@index([jobId, recordedAt])
+  @@index([jobId, createdAt])
   @@map("locate_points")
 }
 

backend/src/app.service.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+import { Test, TestingModule } from '@nestjs/testing';
+import { AppService } from './app.service';
+
+// Smoke test for the QA gate (S1-f, trace: SRS §6 gate / NFR-8).
+// Exercises Nest DI wiring end-to-end for a pure service so a green run proves the
+// toolchain (ts-jest + @nestjs/testing) is functional. Real coverage grows from here.
+describe('AppService (smoke)', () => {
+  let service: AppService;
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    const moduleRef: TestingModule = await Test.createTestingModule({
+      providers: [AppService],
+    }).compile();
+    service = moduleRef.get<AppService>(AppService);
+  });
+
+  it('is resolvable from the DI container', () => {
+    expect(service).toBeDefined();
+  });
+
+  it('returns the API welcome payload', () => {
+    expect(service.getHello()).toEqual({
+      message: 'Welcome to UlHub API',
+      docs: 'GET /api',
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/src/ingest/app-log-ingest.service.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
+import { readFileSync } from 'fs';
+import { resolve } from 'path';
+import { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
+import { RealtimeService } from '../realtime/realtime.service';
+import { AppLogAck } from './dto/app-messages.dto';
+import { AppLogIngestService } from './app-log-ingest.service';
+import { MqttClientService } from './mqtt-client.service';
+
+// Unit coverage for the durable app-log ingest path (S2-a, SRS-SYN-2/7, §3.4.2).
+// Prisma is an in-memory fake keyed on pointId so idempotency is exercised for real
+// (a replayed UUID must be stored exactly once), without a database. The broker is a
+// spy so we can assert the application-level ack shape and topic.
+describe('AppLogIngestService', () => {
+  const ORG = 'org_alpha';
+  const CLIENT = 'app_client_1';
+  const JOB = { id: 'job_1', orgId: ORG, ticketNumber: 'T-1' };
+
+  let service: AppLogIngestService;
+  let published: { topic: string; payload: AppLogAck }[];
+  let store: Map<string, { pointId: string; jobId: string; createdAt: Date }>;
+
+  const point = (
+    pointId: string,
+    createdAt: string,
+    extra: Record<string, unknown> = {},
+  ) => ({
+    pointId,
+    createdAt,
+    origin: 'APP',
+    uploadPath: 'APP_MQTT',
+    lat: 40,
+    lng: -80,
+    ts: createdAt,
+    qualityFlag: 'IN_SPEC',
+    ...extra,
+  });
+
+  const msg = (
+    points: object[],
+    job: { jobId?: string; ticket?: string } = { jobId: JOB.id },
+  ) => JSON.stringify({ schemaVersion: '1', ...job, points });
+
+  const lastAck = () => published[published.length - 1].payload;
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    published = [];
+    store = new Map();
+
+    const prisma = {
+      organization: {
+        findUnique: jest.fn(({ where }: { where: { id: string } }) =>
+          Promise.resolve(where.id === ORG ? { id: ORG } : null),
+        ),
+      },
+      job: {
+        findFirst: jest.fn(
+          ({ where }: { where: { id: string; orgId: string } }) =>
+            Promise.resolve(
+              where.id === JOB.id && where.orgId === ORG ? JOB : null,
+            ),
+        ),
+        findUnique: jest.fn(() => Promise.resolve(null)),
+        create: jest.fn(() => Promise.resolve(JOB)),
+      },
+      locatePoint: {
+        findMany: jest.fn(
+          ({ where }: { where: { pointId: { in: string[] } } }) =>
+            Promise.resolve(
+              where.pointId.in
+                .filter((id) => store.has(id))
+                .map((pointId) => ({ pointId })),
+            ),
+        ),
+        createManyAndReturn: jest.fn(
+          ({
+            data,
+          }: {
+            data: { pointId: string; jobId: string; createdAt: Date }[];
+          }) => {
+            const inserted: unknown[] = [];
+            for (const row of data) {
+              if (store.has(row.pointId)) {
+                continue; // skipDuplicates
+              }
+              store.set(row.pointId, row);
+              inserted.push({
+                ...row,
+                id: BigInt(store.size),
+                lat: 40,
+                lng: -80,
+                altitude: null,
+                utilityType: 'UNKNOWN',
+                sequence: null,
+                fixType: 'NONE',
+                hAccuracy: null,
+                vAccuracy: null,
+                satellites: null,
+                hdop: null,
+                depth: null,
+                frequencyHz: null,
+                currentMa: null,
+                signalDb: null,
+                gainDb: null,
+                locateMode: null,
+                phaseDeg: null,
+                compassDeg: null,
+                distortionPct: null,
+                recordedAt: row.createdAt,
+                receivedAt: row.createdAt,
+                origin: 'APP',
+                uploadPath: 'APP_MQTT',
+                originClientId: CLIENT,
+                deviceId: null,
+              });
+            }
+            return Promise.resolve(inserted);
+          },
+        ),
+      },
+    };
+
+    const mqtt = {
+      publish: jest.fn((topic: string, payload: AppLogAck) =>
+        published.push({ topic, payload }),
+      ),
+    };
+
+    const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
+      providers: [
+        AppLogIngestService,
+        { provide: PrismaService, useValue: prisma },
+        { provide: RealtimeService, useValue: { publish: jest.fn() } },
+        { provide: MqttClientService, useValue: mqtt },
+      ],
+    }).compile();
+
+    service = moduleRef.get(AppLogIngestService);
+  });
+
+  it('ingests a fresh point once and acks it accepted on the client namespace', async () => {
+    await service.handle(
+      ORG,
+      CLIENT,
+      msg([
+        point('018f1a00-0000-7000-8000-000000000001', '2026-08-21T10:00:00Z'),
+      ]),
+    );
+
+    expect(store.size).toBe(1);
+    expect(published[0].topic).toBe(`ul/${ORG}/app/${CLIENT}/ack`);
+    const ack = lastAck();
+    expect(ack.results).toEqual([
+      { pointId: '018f1a00-0000-7000-8000-000000000001', outcome: 'ACCEPTED' },
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('consumes the shared app fixture and emits the shared ack fixture', async () => {
+    const fixtureRoot = resolve(
+      __dirname,
+      '../../../../meta/contracts/fixtures',
+    );
+    const publishFixture = readFileSync(
+      resolve(fixtureRoot, 'app-log-points-v1.json'),
+      'utf8',
+    );
+    const expectedAck = JSON.parse(
+      readFileSync(resolve(fixtureRoot, 'app-log-ack-v1.json'), 'utf8'),
+    );
+
+    await service.handle(ORG, CLIENT, publishFixture);
+
+    expect(store.size).toBe(1);
+    expect(lastAck()).toEqual(expectedAck);
+  });
+
+  it('ingests a replayed UUID exactly once (idempotency) and acks it as duplicate', async () => {
+    const p = point(
+      '018f1a00-0000-7000-8000-000000000002',
+      '2026-08-21T10:00:00Z',
+    );
+    await service.handle(ORG, CLIENT, msg([p]));
+    await service.handle(ORG, CLIENT, msg([p])); // replay
+
+    expect(store.size).toBe(1); // stored exactly once
+    const ack = lastAck();
+    expect(ack.results).toEqual([
+      { pointId: '018f1a00-0000-7000-8000-000000000002', outcome: 'DUPLICATE' },
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('orders a batch by event time, not array order', async () => {
+    const later = point(
+      '018f1a00-0000-7000-8000-00000000000a',
+      '2026-08-21T10:05:00Z',
+    );
+    const earlier = point(
+      '018f1a00-0000-7000-8000-00000000000b',
+      '2026-08-21T10:01:00Z',
+    );
+    await service.handle(ORG, CLIENT, msg([later, earlier]));
+
+    const rows = [...store.values()];
+    expect(rows.map((r) => r.pointId)).toEqual([
+      earlier.pointId,
+      later.pointId,
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a point whose jobId belongs to another org (cross-namespace backstop)', async () => {
+    await service.handle(
+      ORG,
+      CLIENT,
+      msg(
+        [point('018f1a00-0000-7000-8000-00000000000c', '2026-08-21T10:00:00Z')],
+        { jobId: 'job_of_org_beta' },
+      ),
+    );
+
+    expect(store.size).toBe(0);
+    const ack = lastAck();
+    expect(ack.results).toEqual([
+      {
+        pointId: '018f1a00-0000-7000-8000-00000000000c',
+        outcome: 'REJECTED',
+        reasonCode: 'UNKNOWN_JOB_OR_WRONG_ORG',
+      },
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('drops (no ack) a message on an unknown org namespace', async () => {
+    await service.handle(
+      'org_ghost',
+      CLIENT,
+      msg([
+        point('018f1a00-0000-7000-8000-00000000000d', '2026-08-21T10:00:00Z'),
+      ]),
+    );
+    expect(published).toHaveLength(0);
+    expect(store.size).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  it('does not emit an ambiguous ack when malformed JSON has no usable pointId', async () => {
+    await service.handle(ORG, CLIENT, '{ not json');
+    expect(published).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a schema-invalid point but names its UUID in the ack', async () => {
+    // Missing required createdAt + bad lat → validation fails; pointId still surfaced.
+    await service.handle(
+      ORG,
+      CLIENT,
+      msg([
+        {
+          pointId: '018f1a00-0000-7000-8000-00000000000e',
+          lat: 999,
+          lng: 0,
+          ts: '2026-08-21T10:00:00Z',
+        },
+      ]),
+    );
+    const ack = lastAck();
+    expect(store.size).toBe(0);
+    expect(ack.results).toEqual([
+      {
+        pointId: '018f1a00-0000-7000-8000-00000000000e',
+        outcome: 'REJECTED',
+        reasonCode: 'VALIDATION_ERROR',
+      },
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a valid point while rejecting a malformed neighbor in the same batch', async () => {
+    const bad = point(
+      '018f1a00-0000-7000-8000-00000000000f',
+      '2026-08-21T10:00:00Z',
+      { lat: 999 },
+    );
+    const good = point(
+      '018f1a00-0000-7000-8000-000000000010',
+      '2026-08-21T10:00:01Z',
+    );
+    await service.handle(ORG, CLIENT, msg([bad, good]));
+
+    expect(store.size).toBe(1);
+    expect(lastAck().results).toEqual(
+      expect.arrayContaining([
+        {
+          pointId: bad.pointId,
+          outcome: 'REJECTED',
+          reasonCode: 'VALIDATION_ERROR',
+        },
+        { pointId: good.pointId, outcome: 'ACCEPTED' },
+      ]),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a non-v7 UUID even when it is otherwise a valid UUID', async () => {
+    const uuidV4 = '550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000';
+    await service.handle(
+      ORG,
+      CLIENT,
+      msg([point(uuidV4, '2026-08-21T10:00:00Z')]),
+    );
+
+    expect(store.size).toBe(0);
+    expect(lastAck().results).toEqual([
+      {
+        pointId: uuidV4,
+        outcome: 'REJECTED',
+        reasonCode: 'POINT_ID_NOT_UUIDV7',
+      },
+    ]);
+  });
+});

backend/src/ingest/app-log-ingest.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+import { Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { GpsFixType, Prisma } from '@prisma/client';
+import { plainToInstance } from 'class-transformer';
+import { validate } from 'class-validator';
+import { toPointDto } from '../points/points.service';
+import { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
+import { RealtimeService } from '../realtime/realtime.service';
+import {
+  AppFixType,
+  AppLogAck,
+  AppLogAckResult,
+  AppLogPointDto,
+  AppLogPointsMessageDto,
+} from './dto/app-messages.dto';
+import { MqttClientService } from './mqtt-client.service';
+
+const SCHEMA_VERSION = '1';
+const UUID_V7 =
+  /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-7[0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;
+
+// Durable app-originated ingest for ul/{orgId}/app/{clientId}/log/points. The exact v1
+// publish/ack envelopes are frozen in meta/contracts/telemetry-schema.md.
+@Injectable()
+export class AppLogIngestService {
+  private readonly logger = new Logger(AppLogIngestService.name);
+
+  constructor(
+    private readonly prisma: PrismaService,
+    private readonly realtime: RealtimeService,
+    private readonly mqttClient: MqttClientService,
+  ) {}
+
+  async handle(
+    orgId: string,
+    clientId: string,
+    rawPayload: string,
+  ): Promise<void> {
+    const org = await this.prisma.organization.findUnique({
+      where: { id: orgId },
+      select: { id: true },
+    });
+    if (!org) {
+      this.logger.warn(
+        `app-log for unknown org "${orgId}" (client ${clientId}) — dropped`,
+      );
+      return;
+    }
+
+    let parsed: unknown;
+    try {
+      parsed = JSON.parse(rawPayload);
+    } catch {
+      // There is no trustworthy pointId to acknowledge. Raw app payloads are redacted by the
+      // router; retain/log on the app side rather than sending a null/ambiguous acknowledgement.
+      this.logger.warn(
+        `invalid JSON from app ${orgId}/${clientId} — no acknowledgement emitted`,
+      );
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const msg = plainToInstance(AppLogPointsMessageDto, parsed as object);
+    const rawPoints = Array.isArray((parsed as { points?: unknown[] })?.points)
+      ? (parsed as { points: unknown[] }).points
+      : [];
+    const usableIds = rawPoints
+      .map((value) =>
+        typeof (value as { pointId?: unknown })?.pointId === 'string'
+          ? (value as { pointId: string }).pointId
+          : null,
+      )
+      .filter((value): value is string => value !== null);
+
+    const hasJobId = typeof msg.jobId === 'string' && msg.jobId.length > 0;
+    const hasTicket = typeof msg.ticket === 'string' && msg.ticket.length > 0;
+    const envelopeValid =
+      msg.schemaVersion === SCHEMA_VERSION &&
+      rawPoints.length > 0 &&
+      rawPoints.length <= 500 &&
+      hasJobId !== hasTicket;
+    if (!envelopeValid) {
+      this.publishAck(
+        orgId,
+        clientId,
+        usableIds.map((pointId) => ({
+          pointId,
+          outcome: 'REJECTED',
+          reasonCode: 'ENVELOPE_VALIDATION_ERROR',
+        })),
+      );
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // Validate independently so one malformed capture does not discard valid captures in the
+    // same batch (LOG-7). Invalid UUID strings can still be named in a rejection; missing IDs
+    // cannot be safely correlated and therefore remain unacknowledged.
+    const results: AppLogAckResult[] = [];
+    const candidates: AppLogPointDto[] = [];
+    for (const rawPoint of rawPoints) {
+      const point = plainToInstance(AppLogPointDto, rawPoint as object);
+      const pointId = typeof point.pointId === 'string' ? point.pointId : null;
+      const errors = await validate(point, { whitelist: true });
+      if (!pointId) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (errors.length > 0 || !UUID_V7.test(pointId)) {
+        results.push({
+          pointId,
+          outcome: 'REJECTED',
+          reasonCode: UUID_V7.test(pointId)
+            ? 'VALIDATION_ERROR'
+            : 'POINT_ID_NOT_UUIDV7',
+        });
+        continue;
+      }
+      candidates.push(point);
+    }
+
+    const job = await this.resolveJob(orgId, clientId, msg);
+    if (!job) {
+      results.push(
+        ...candidates.map((point) => ({
+          pointId: point.pointId,
+          outcome: 'REJECTED' as const,
+          reasonCode: 'UNKNOWN_JOB_OR_WRONG_ORG',
+        })),
+      );
+      this.publishAck(orgId, clientId, results);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // Collapse duplicates inside this delivery, then use producer event time rather than
+    // arrival/array order. The first valid occurrence wins; repeated IDs are safe to release.
+    const byPointId = new Map<string, AppLogPointDto>();
+    for (const point of candidates) {
+      if (byPointId.has(point.pointId)) {
+        results.push({
+          pointId: point.pointId,
+          outcome: 'DUPLICATE',
+          reasonCode: 'DUPLICATE_IN_BATCH',
+        });
+      } else {
+        byPointId.set(point.pointId, point);
+      }
+    }
+    const ordered = [...byPointId.values()].sort(
+      (a, b) => +new Date(a.createdAt) - +new Date(b.createdAt),
+    );
+
+    const seen = ordered.length
+      ? await this.prisma.locatePoint.findMany({
+          where: { pointId: { in: ordered.map((point) => point.pointId) } },
+          select: { pointId: true },
+        })
+      : [];
+    const seenIds = new Set(seen.map((row) => row.pointId));
+    const fresh = ordered.filter((point) => !seenIds.has(point.pointId));
+    for (const point of ordered.filter((candidate) =>
+      seenIds.has(candidate.pointId),
+    )) {
+      results.push({ pointId: point.pointId, outcome: 'DUPLICATE' });
+    }
+
+    let stored: Awaited<
+      ReturnType<typeof this.prisma.locatePoint.createManyAndReturn>
+    > = [];
+    if (fresh.length > 0) {
+      stored = await this.prisma.locatePoint.createManyAndReturn({
+        data: fresh.map((point) => ({
+          jobId: job.id,
+          deviceId: null,
+          pointId: point.pointId,
+          origin: 'APP' as const,
+          uploadPath: 'APP_MQTT' as const,
+          originClientId: clientId,
+          createdAt: new Date(point.createdAt),
+          lat: point.lat,
+          lng: point.lng,
+          altitude: point.alt,
+          utilityType: point.utility,
+          sequence: point.seq,
+          fixType: this.toStoredFix(point.fix),
+          hAccuracy: point.hAcc,
+          vAccuracy: point.vAcc,
+          satellites: point.sats,
+          hdop: point.hdop,
+          depth: point.depth,
+          frequencyHz: point.freqHz,
+          currentMa: point.currentMa,
+          signalDb: point.signalDb,
+          gainDb: point.gainDb,
+          locateMode: point.mode,
+          phaseDeg: point.phaseDeg,
+          compassDeg: point.compassDeg,
+          distortionPct: point.distortionPct,
+          recordedAt: new Date(point.ts),
+          raw: point as unknown as Prisma.InputJsonValue,
+        })),
+        skipDuplicates: true,
+      });
+    }
+
+    const storedIds = new Set(stored.map((row) => row.pointId));
+    for (const point of fresh) {
+      results.push({
+        pointId: point.pointId,
+        outcome: storedIds.has(point.pointId) ? 'ACCEPTED' : 'DUPLICATE',
+      });
+    }
+
+    if (stored.length > 0) {
+      this.realtime.publish(`job:${job.id}`, {
+        type: 'points',
+        jobId: job.id,
+        points: stored.map(toPointDto),
+      });
+    }
+    this.publishAck(orgId, clientId, results);
+  }
+
+  private async resolveJob(
+    orgId: string,
+    clientId: string,
+    msg: AppLogPointsMessageDto,
+  ) {
+    if (msg.jobId) {
+      const job = await this.prisma.job.findFirst({
+        where: { id: msg.jobId, orgId },
+      });
+      if (!job)
+        this.logger.warn(
+          `app-log ${orgId}/${clientId} referenced a foreign/unknown job ${msg.jobId}`,
+        );
+      return job;
+    }
+    const existing = await this.prisma.job.findUnique({
+      where: { orgId_ticketNumber: { orgId, ticketNumber: msg.ticket! } },
+    });
+    if (existing) return existing;
+    return this.prisma.job.create({
+      data: {
+        orgId,
+        ticketNumber: msg.ticket!,
+        title: `Ticket ${msg.ticket} (app-created)`,
+        status: 'IN_PROGRESS',
+        source: 'WEB',
+        startedAt: new Date(),
+      },
+    });
+  }
+
+  private toStoredFix(fix?: AppFixType): GpsFixType | undefined {
+    switch (fix) {
+      case 'FLOAT':
+        return GpsFixType.FLOAT_RTK;
+      case 'FIXED':
+        return GpsFixType.FIXED_RTK;
+      case 'NO_FIX':
+        return GpsFixType.NONE;
+      case 'AUTONOMOUS':
+        return GpsFixType.AUTONOMOUS;
+      case 'DGPS':
+        return GpsFixType.DGPS;
+      default:
+        return undefined;
+    }
+  }
+
+  private publishAck(
+    orgId: string,
+    clientId: string,
+    results: AppLogAckResult[],
+  ): void {
+    if (results.length === 0) return;
+    const ack: AppLogAck = { schemaVersion: SCHEMA_VERSION, results };
+    this.mqttClient.publish(`ul/${orgId}/app/${clientId}/ack`, ack);
+  }
+}

backend/src/ingest/dto/app-messages.dto.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+import { LocateMode, UtilityType } from '@prisma/client';
+import { ApiProperty, ApiPropertyOptional } from '@nestjs/swagger';
+import { Type } from 'class-transformer';
+import {
+  ArrayMaxSize,
+  ArrayMinSize,
+  IsArray,
+  IsDateString,
+  IsEnum,
+  IsIn,
+  IsInt,
+  IsNumber,
+  IsOptional,
+  IsString,
+  IsUUID,
+  Max,
+  MaxLength,
+  Min,
+  ValidateNested,
+} from 'class-validator';
+
+export const APP_FIX_TYPES = [
+  'AUTONOMOUS',
+  'DGPS',
+  'FLOAT',
+  'FIXED',
+  'NO_FIX',
+] as const;
+export type AppFixType = (typeof APP_FIX_TYPES)[number];
+
+// Frozen app MQTT wire profile v1 from meta/contracts/telemetry-schema.md. This is deliberately
+// separate from MqttPointDto: the app wire uses the normative fix tokens FLOAT/FIXED/NO_FIX,
+// while the legacy device path uses Prisma's FLOAT_RTK/FIXED_RTK/NONE storage tokens.
+export class AppLogPointDto {
+  @ApiProperty({
+    format: 'uuid',
+    description: 'Client-generated UUIDv7 idempotency key.',
+  })
+  @IsUUID()
+  pointId: string;
+
+  @ApiProperty({ format: 'date-time' })
+  @IsDateString()
+  createdAt: string;
+
+  @IsIn(['APP'])
+  origin: 'APP';
+
+  @IsIn(['APP_MQTT'])
+  uploadPath: 'APP_MQTT';
+
+  @IsNumber()
+  @Min(-90)
+  @Max(90)
+  lat: number;
+
+  @IsNumber()
+  @Min(-180)
+  @Max(180)
+  lng: number;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsNumber()
+  alt?: number;
+
+  @IsDateString()
+  ts: string;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsIn(APP_FIX_TYPES)
+  fix?: AppFixType;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsNumber()
+  @Min(0)
+  hAcc?: number;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsNumber()
+  @Min(0)
+  vAcc?: number;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsInt()
+  @Min(0)
+  sats?: number;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsNumber()
+  @Min(0)
+  hdop?: number;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsNumber()
+  @Min(0)
+  depth?: number;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsInt()
+  @Min(0)
+  freqHz?: number;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsNumber()
+  @Min(0)
+  currentMa?: number;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsNumber()
+  signalDb?: number;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsNumber()
+  gainDb?: number;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsEnum(LocateMode)
+  mode?: LocateMode;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsNumber()
+  phaseDeg?: number;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsNumber()
+  @Min(0)
+  @Max(360)
+  compassDeg?: number;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsNumber()
+  @Min(0)
+  @Max(100)
+  distortionPct?: number;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsEnum(UtilityType)
+  utility?: UtilityType;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsInt()
+  seq?: number;
+
+  @IsIn(['IN_SPEC', 'OUT_OF_SPEC', 'MANUAL', 'PPK_CORRECTED', 'WAIVED', 'NONCOMPLIANT'])
+  qualityFlag: 'IN_SPEC' | 'OUT_OF_SPEC' | 'MANUAL' | 'PPK_CORRECTED' | 'WAIVED' | 'NONCOMPLIANT';
+}
+
+export class AppLogPointsMessageDto {
+  @ApiPropertyOptional({ description: 'MQTT app-log wire profile version.' })
+  @IsString()
+  @MaxLength(16)
+  schemaVersion: string;
+
+  @ApiPropertyOptional({
+    description: 'Job id; exactly one of jobId or ticket is required.',
+  })
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsString()
+  jobId?: string;
+
+  @ApiPropertyOptional({
+    description: 'Ticket number; exactly one of jobId or ticket is required.',
+  })
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsString()
+  @MaxLength(64)
+  ticket?: string;
+
+  @ApiProperty({ type: [AppLogPointDto] })
+  @IsArray()
+  @ArrayMinSize(1)
+  @ArrayMaxSize(500)
+  @ValidateNested({ each: true })
+  @Type(() => AppLogPointDto)
+  points: AppLogPointDto[];
+}
+
+export type AppLogAckOutcome = 'ACCEPTED' | 'DUPLICATE' | 'REJECTED';
+
+export interface AppLogAckResult {
+  pointId: string;
+  outcome: AppLogAckOutcome;
+  reasonCode?: string;
+}
+
+export interface AppLogAck {
+  schemaVersion: string;
+  results: AppLogAckResult[];
+}

backend/src/ingest/ingest-router.service.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import { Injectable, Logger, OnModuleInit } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
+import { AppLogIngestService } from './app-log-ingest.service';
 import { JobsIngestService } from './jobs-ingest.service';
 import { LogIngestService } from './log-ingest.service';
 import { MqttClientService } from './mqtt-client.service';
@@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ export class IngestRouterService implements OnModuleInit {
     private readonly pointsIngest: PointsIngestService,
     private readonly jobsIngest: JobsIngestService,
     private readonly logIngest: LogIngestService,
+    private readonly appLogIngest: AppLogIngestService,
   ) {}
 
   onModuleInit() {
@@ -26,10 +28,32 @@ export class IngestRouterService implements OnModuleInit {
   }
 
   private async route(topic: string, payload: string) {
-    // Raw log captures every message on devices/#, matched or not (audit/debug trail)
+    const segments = topic.split('/');
-    await this.prisma.deviceEvent.create({ data: { topic, payload } });
+    const root = segments[0];
 
-    const [root, idSegment, ...rest] = topic.split('/');
+    // App point payloads contain personal/location data. Preserve routing evidence without
+    // creating an unmanaged second copy of the telemetry in device_events (S2 security H3).
+    const auditPayload =
+      root === 'ul' &&
+      segments[2] === 'app' &&
+      segments.slice(4).join('/') === 'log/points'
+        ? JSON.stringify({
+            redacted: true,
+            bytes: Buffer.byteLength(payload, 'utf8'),
+          })
+        : payload;
+    await this.prisma.deviceEvent.create({
+      data: { topic, payload: auditPayload },
+    });
+
+    // App / device MQTT namespace: ul/{orgId}/{clientClass}/{clientId}/{subtopic...}
+    // (SRS §3.4.2). Sprint 2 handles the durable app-log path; other clientClasses and
+    // subtopics are represented but not yet ingested here.
+    if (root === 'ul') {
+      return this.routeUl(segments, payload);
+    }
+
+    const [, idSegment, ...rest] = segments;
     const subtopic = rest.join('/');
     if (root !== 'devices' || !idSegment || subtopic === 'jobs/ack') {
       return; // not device traffic, or our own ack echoed back
@@ -42,13 +66,19 @@ export class IngestRouterService implements OnModuleInit {
       return;
     }
 
-    const device = await this.prisma.device.findUnique({ where: { mqttUsername: idSegment } });
+    const device = await this.prisma.device.findUnique({
+      where: { mqttUsername: idSegment },
+    });
     if (!device) {
-      this.logger.warn(`Message from unregistered device username "${idSegment}" (raw-logged only)`);
+      this.logger.warn(
+        `Message from unregistered device username "${idSegment}" (raw-logged only)`,
+      );
       return;
     }
     if (!device.isActive) {
-      this.logger.warn(`Message from deactivated device "${idSegment}" ignored`);
+      this.logger.warn(
+        `Message from deactivated device "${idSegment}" ignored`,
+      );
       return;
     }
 
@@ -69,4 +99,29 @@ export class IngestRouterService implements OnModuleInit {
         this.logger.debug(`Unhandled subtopic "${subtopic}" from ${idSegment}`);
     }
   }
+
+  // ul/{orgId}/{clientClass}/{clientId}/{subtopic...} — SRS §3.4.2 topic scheme.
+  // The namespace itself carries tenant (orgId) + publisher (clientId) identity; the
+  // broker ACL confines a publisher to its own namespace, and AppLogIngest re-checks
+  // tenant scope on the payload's job as a backstop. Only the durable app-log path is
+  // ingested this sprint.
+  private async routeUl(segments: string[], payload: string) {
+    const [, orgId, clientClass, clientId, ...rest] = segments;
+    const subtopic = rest.join('/');
+    if (!orgId || !clientClass || !clientId) {
+      this.logger.warn(`Malformed ul topic "${segments.join('/')}" — ignored`);
+      return;
+    }
+    // Our own cloud→publisher acks are echoed back to us on the same subscription; skip.
+    if (subtopic === 'ack') {
+      return;
+    }
+    if (clientClass === 'app' && subtopic === 'log/points') {
+      await this.appLogIngest.handle(orgId, clientId, payload);
+      return;
+    }
+    this.logger.debug(
+      `Unhandled ul path "${clientClass}/${subtopic}" (org ${orgId}, client ${clientId})`,
+    );
+  }
 }

backend/src/ingest/ingest.module.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { RealtimeModule } from '../realtime/realtime.module';
+import { AppLogIngestService } from './app-log-ingest.service';
 import { IngestRouterService } from './ingest-router.service';
 import { JobsIngestService } from './jobs-ingest.service';
 import { LocatorRegistryService } from './locator-registry.service';
@@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ import { PointsIngestService } from './points-ingest.service';
     PointsIngestService,
     JobsIngestService,
     LogIngestService,
+    AppLogIngestService,
     LocatorRegistryService,
   ],
   exports: [MqttClientService],

backend/src/ingest/mqtt-client.service.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
-import { Injectable, Logger, OnModuleDestroy, OnModuleInit } from '@nestjs/common';
+import {
+  Injectable,
+  Logger,
+  OnModuleDestroy,
+  OnModuleInit,
+} from '@nestjs/common';
 import { connect, MqttClient } from 'mqtt';
 
 export type MqttMessageListener = (topic: string, payload: Buffer) => void;
@@ -12,19 +17,29 @@ export class MqttClientService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
   onModuleInit() {
     const host = process.env.MQTT_HOST || 'mosquitto';
     const port = Number(process.env.MQTT_PORT || 1883);
+    const username = process.env.MQTT_USERNAME;
+    const password = process.env.MQTT_PASSWORD;
+    if (!username || !password) {
+      throw new Error(
+        'MQTT_USERNAME and MQTT_PASSWORD are required; refusing to use a default broker credential.',
+      );
+    }
     this.client = connect(`mqtt://${host}:${port}`, {
-      username: process.env.MQTT_USERNAME || 'backend',
+      username,
-      password: process.env.MQTT_PASSWORD || 'backendpass',
+      password,
       clientId: `ulhub-backend-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`,
     });
 
     this.client.on('connect', () => {
       this.logger.log(`Connected to MQTT broker at ${host}:${port}`);
-      this.client!.subscribe('devices/#', (err) => {
+      // devices/# = legacy device-direct namespace; ul/# = SRS §3.4.2 topic scheme
+      // (app + device-direct). QoS 1 so the broker redelivers durable log records the
+      // backend missed while disconnected (broker loss ≠ capture loss, SRS-SYN-1/7).
+      this.client!.subscribe(['devices/#', 'ul/#'], { qos: 1 }, (err) => {
         if (err) {
-          this.logger.error('Failed to subscribe to devices/#', err);
+          this.logger.error('Failed to subscribe to devices/# + ul/#', err);
         } else {
-          this.logger.log('Subscribed to devices/#');
+          this.logger.log('Subscribed to devices/# and ul/#');
         }
       });
     });

backend/src/points/points.service.ts

@@ -6,8 +6,13 @@ import { CreatePointDto, QueryPointsDto } from './dto/points.dto';
 // JSON-safe shape: BigInt id -> string, Decimal -> number
 export interface PointDto {
   id: string;
+  pointId: string | null;
   jobId: string;
   deviceId: string | null;
+  origin: string;
+  uploadPath: string | null;
+  originClientId: string | null;
+  createdAt: Date | null;
   lat: number;
   lng: number;
   altitude: number | null;
@@ -38,8 +43,13 @@ function num(value: unknown): number | null {
 export function toPointDto(p: LocatePoint): PointDto {
   return {
     id: p.id.toString(),
+    pointId: p.pointId,
     jobId: p.jobId,
     deviceId: p.deviceId,
+    origin: p.origin,
+    uploadPath: p.uploadPath,
+    originClientId: p.originClientId,
+    createdAt: p.createdAt,
     lat: Number(p.lat),
     lng: Number(p.lng),
     altitude: num(p.altitude),

docker-compose.yml

@@ -11,11 +11,13 @@ services:
   mosquitto:
     image: eclipse-mosquitto:2
     ports:
-      - "1883:1883"
       - "8883:8883"
-      - "9001:9001"
+      - "8884:8884"
+      - "127.0.0.1:9001:9001"
     volumes:
       - ./mosquitto:/mosquitto
+      - /home/ubuntu/.config/ul-platform/mosquitto.passwd:/run/secrets/mosquitto_passwd:ro
+      - /home/ubuntu/.config/ul-platform/mosquitto.acl:/run/secrets/mosquitto_acl:ro
 
   backend:
     build:
@@ -37,7 +39,7 @@ services:
       MQTT_HOST: mosquitto
       MQTT_PORT: 1883
       MQTT_USERNAME: ${MQTT_BACKEND_USERNAME:-backend}
-      MQTT_PASSWORD: ${MQTT_BACKEND_PASSWORD:-backendpass}
+      MQTT_PASSWORD: ${MQTT_BACKEND_PASSWORD:?set MQTT_BACKEND_PASSWORD}
       MQTT_CERTS_DIR: /mosquitto-certs
       MQTT_TLS_PORT: 8883
       # Must match the CN the broker's server cert was provisioned for

mosquitto/config/devices.acl

@@ -12,10 +12,22 @@ topic readwrite #
 topic readwrite $SYS/#
 
 # Backend service: reads all device traffic, writes job acks back to devices,
-# and publishes on behalf of the /sim simulator tool (devices/<serial>/log)
+# and publishes on behalf of the /sim simulator tool (devices/<serial>/log).
+# Also ingests the SRS §3.4.2 ul/# namespace (app + device-direct) and writes the
+# application-level acks back on ul/{orgId}/{clientClass}/{clientId}/ack.
 user backend
 topic read devices/#
 topic write devices/+/jobs/ack
 topic write devices/+/log
+topic read ul/#
+topic write ul/+/+/+/ack
+
+# --- App-client namespace confinement (S2-a / SRS §3.4.2 Topic scheme) --------------
+# The interim app credential uses username == orgId, so %u confines it to that tenant.
+# The '+' clientId wildcard is the accepted Sprint 2 tradeoff: clients within one org share
+# the credential and can see that org's ack topics until OIDC-derived per-client identity lands.
+# Publish/read permissions are narrower than readwrite '#': only durable point input and acks.
+pattern write ul/%u/app/+/log/points
+pattern read ul/%u/app/+/ack
 
 # testuser is a demo *device*: only the per-device pattern rule above applies

mosquitto/config/mosquitto.conf

@@ -2,14 +2,17 @@ per_listener_settings true
 
 # Plain MQTT — internal services and clients authenticate with username/password on port 1883
 listener 1883 0.0.0.0
-password_file /mosquitto/config/passwd
+password_file /run/secrets/mosquitto_passwd
-acl_file /mosquitto/config/devices.acl
+acl_file /run/secrets/mosquitto_acl
 allow_anonymous false
 
-# WebSocket — browser clients, no authentication required
+# Authenticated MQTT over WebSocket for app clients. Docker binds this listener only to
+# host loopback; nginx supplies the public WSS/TLS endpoint at /mqtt on port 443.
 listener 9001 0.0.0.0
 protocol websockets
-allow_anonymous true
+password_file /run/secrets/mosquitto_passwd
+acl_file /run/secrets/mosquitto_acl
+allow_anonymous false
 
 # TLS MQTT — devices authenticate with client certificates (port 8883)
 # require_certificate true forces client cert; cert CN becomes the MQTT username.
@@ -19,20 +22,19 @@ allow_anonymous true
 # since there's no config/cert hot-reload.
 listener 8883 0.0.0.0
 cafile /mosquitto/certs/ca.crt
-certfile /mosquitto/certs/server.crt
+certfile /mosquitto/certs/public-fullchain.pem
-keyfile /mosquitto/certs/server.key
+keyfile /mosquitto/certs/public-privkey.pem
 require_certificate true
 use_identity_as_username true
 allow_anonymous false
-acl_file /mosquitto/config/devices.acl
+acl_file /run/secrets/mosquitto_acl
 
-# TLS MQTT — admin access via username/password, no client cert required (port 8884)
+# TLS MQTT — app/admin username+password access (port 8884). App usernames are orgIds;
-# Connect with CA cert for server verification, then username/password.
+# devices.acl confines them to ul/{orgId}/app/... . No anonymous listener is exposed.
-# listener 8884 0.0.0.0
+listener 8884 0.0.0.0
-# cafile /mosquitto/certs/ca.crt
+certfile /mosquitto/certs/public-fullchain.pem
-# certfile /mosquitto/certs/server.crt
+keyfile /mosquitto/certs/public-privkey.pem
-# keyfile /mosquitto/certs/server.key
+require_certificate false
-# require_certificate false
+password_file /run/secrets/mosquitto_passwd
-# password_file /mosquitto/config/passwd
+allow_anonymous false
-# allow_anonymous false
+acl_file /run/secrets/mosquitto_acl
-# acl_file /mosquitto/config/devices.acl

nginx/dev.hub.umagul.net.conf

@@ -6,18 +6,6 @@ server {
         root /var/www/certbot;
     }
 
-    location /mqtt {
-        # proxy MQTT over WebSocket (strip the /mqtt prefix so Mosquitto sees /)
-        proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:9001/;
-        proxy_http_version 1.1;
-        proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
-        proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade";
-        proxy_set_header Host $host;
-        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
-        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
-        proxy_read_timeout 300s;
-    }
-
     location / {
         return 301 https://$host$request_uri;
     }
@@ -33,6 +21,8 @@ server {
     client_max_body_size 20m;
 
     location /mqtt {
+        # Authenticated, ACL-confined MQTT-over-WebSocket. Mosquitto is bound to loopback;
+        # nginx terminates publicly trusted TLS so phones can use standard port 443.
         proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:9001/;
         proxy_http_version 1.1;
         proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;